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21. Introduction
In this paper we analyse some of the problems that the monetary authorities are facing
and will continue to face in the future. We first identify the major problem with which
the ECB will be confronted, i.e. how to conduct monetary policies in a union where
asymmetric shocks occur and where the same shocks are transmitted differently
among member countries. We then shift our focus towards the formulation of ultimate
and final targets of monetary policy. In this connection, we will discuss the ECB
“Monetary Policy Strategy”.
2. Central Banking and asymmetries of shocks
Euroland is likely to experience asymmetric shocks. How will the existence of such
asymmetries affect policy-making by the ECB? In figures 1 and 2 we analyse this
issue by presenting a two-country version of the Barro-Gordon model2. The
negatively sloped lines are the short-term Phillips curves. The vertical lines are the
long-run Phillips curves corresponding with the natural unemployment rate (UN). The
upward sloping dotted lines are the optima stabilisation lines. These show how the
authorities optimally adjust the inflation rates to unanticipated shocks in
unemployment. (In appendix we show how these stabilisation lines can be derived
from the Barro-Gordon model).
We first analyse the effects of a ‘pure’ asymmetric shock. We then contrast it with a
‘pure’ symmetric shock. In figure 1 we study the asymmetric shocks. We show one
country experiencing a sudden decline in unemployment (France), the other an
increase (Germany), and assume that the positive shock in one country is exactly
offset by the negative shock in the other country. This assumption makes it a pure
asymmetric shock. The ECB, which is responsible for maintaining price stability and
for stabilising the economy in Euroland as a whole aggregates the numbers. As a
result, when observing the economic conditions prevailing in Euroland, it will decide
that since inflation and unemployment have remained unchanged, no change in
policies is called for. As can be seen from figure 1, the result is a greater fluctuation in
3unemployment in the individual countries. In the recession country, unemployment
increases to U1 which exceeds the increase one would obtain if the central bank were
able to take action to deal with the shock occurring in that country. The opposite holds
in booming country.
In this extreme case of a pure asymmetric shock, the ECB never stabilises. The ECB
is completely paralysed. It behaves as if the weight it attaches to unemployment
stabilisation is zero. As a result, unemployment (and output) in the individual
countries fluctuate not around positive expansion paths but around a horizontal line.
The ECB will be perceived as super conservative in the countries involved.
Figure 1: Asymmetric shock and monetary policy of the ECB
GERMANY FRANCE
  Inflation inflation
UN     U2   U1      U UN    U
The symmetric case is shown in figure 2. We now assume that the shock is exactly the
same in both countries, i.e. the short-term Phillips curve shifts upwards in both France
and Germany. The ECB observes an increase in unemployment in Euroland as a
whole. Given its desire to stabilise as expressed by the upward sloping optimal
stabilisation line, it takes action and follows an expansionary monetary policy. We
move to points A and A’. Although from the German point of view, the shock is the
                                                                                                                                           
2  We assume here equal sized countries. Things are more complicated when countries are not
of equal size. See De Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy(1999).
4same, the ECB is now capable of stimulating the economy in Germany and to reduce
the increase in unemployment.
Figure 2 : Symmetric shock
GERMANY FRANCE
  Inflation inflation
          A  A’
UN     U2      U UN U
Thus, the effectiveness of the ECB to stabilise output in individual countries depends
on whether the shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. In practice, shocks will always
be some mixture of symmetric and asymmetric movements. We can derive the
following important conclusion. To the extent that there is some asymmetric
component in the shocks, the ECB will always stabilise too little from the point of
view of the individual member state. We illustrate this in figure 3, where we show an
individual member state. We assume that the short-term Phillips curve moves up and
down in an unpredictable way. When these shocks are purely asymmetric, the ECB
does nothing so that unemployment varies along the horizontal dotted line. If these
shocks in the Phillips curve are purely symmetric, the ECB will stabilise to the extent
given by its optimal stabilisation line. Unemployment will then fluctuate between the
points A and A’. We show the more likely intermediate case where the shock is a
combination of symmetry and asymmetry. In this case the stabilisation will be given
by the line SS which is intermediate between the pure asymmetry and symmetry
cases. Unemployment now fluctuates between the points B and B’. Thus, there will
5always be too little stabilisation from the point of view of the individual country. This
may lead to conflicts between individual nations and the ECB.
Figure 3
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Can this problem of insufficient stabilisation be resolved? The answer is negative.
The analysis we have performed is just an extension of the theory of optimum
currency areas. This says that if countries are subject to asymmetric shocks and if they
lack sufficient flexibility, they will find it costly to be in a monetary union. The
analysis of this paper gives practical content to this theory. Thus, if countries do form
an optimum currency area (in the sense of not being subjected much to asymmetric
shocks) the ECB will have a relatively easy time to stabilise shocks, and there will be
few conflicts between member states and the ECB. Conversely, if countries do not
form an optimum currency area the ECB will have a hard time to stabilise output and
employment. There will also be a lot of conflict between member-states and the ECB
The sixty-four thousand-dollar questions are how important these asymmetric shocks
will be in the future. This question has been hotly debated in the literature (see De
Grauwe(1997) and Gros § Thygesen(1998)). Ultimately this is an empirical question.
There is some empirical evidence (see e.g. Frankel and Rose(1998)) indicating that as
Euroland integrates more an increasing amount of shocks are likely to be regional or
6border overlapping. As a result, the problem the ECB will face may not be very
different from the problem any central bank of a country (that is not too small) faces
when regional shocks occur. Such a central bank is equally incapable of using its
monetary policy to deal with a regional problem.
There are, of course, a number of provisos to be added here. First, nation-states are
different from regions, and may react differently when they feel that the central bank
is not capable of dealing with shocks that hit them more than other countries. Second,
the fact that nation-states continue to exist creates the potential for shocks that have a
political or social origin. The difficulty to deal with such a shock in a monetary union
may lead politicians to look for a scapegoat in the ECB. Third, the existence of
different nations with their own legal and cultural systems leads to different
transmission mechanisms of the policies of the ECB, creating a different view about
what exactly the ECB should do. We pursue this question of asymmetric transmission
mechanisms in section 4.
3. EMU versus EMS
The previous analysis revealed a problem of monetary stabilisation in a monetary
union. One may argue that the way the problem was presented is unfair to EMU,
because we compared EMU to an ideal situation in which each country can set
monetary policies optimally. In practice, many countries (if not most) do select an
optimal point on their stabilisation line because they fear that the exchange rate
variations that are implicit in such policies, will introduce new sources of volatility
and affect their trade negatively. As a result, many countries peg their exchange rate
and abstain from using monetary policies as a stabilising tool. This was also the case
within the EMS, which preceded EMU. During the EMS-period, most EU-countries
pegged their exchange rate to the German mark, letting the Bundesbank decide about
monetary policies. It may therefore be fairer to EMU to compare the latter regime
with the EMS-regime. We do this in Fig. 4. We assume (as before) that Germany is
the leader. It sets its monetary policy optimally based on the shocks that occur in
Germany. France pegs its currency to the German mark and, therefore, has to accept
whatever policy decision Germany takes.
7In Fig. 4, we suppose as before a pure asymmetric shock. The short-term Phillips
curve shifts upwards in Germany and downwards in France. Germany has the
freedom to set its monetary policy optimally, and selects point G, i.e. it reacts to the
increase in unemployment by expansionary monetary policies, which raise the
inflation rate temporarily.  Since France has pegged its currency to the German mark,
it has to follow this expansionary policy. This brings the French economy to point F.
When we compare this outcome with EMU we find (not surprisingly) that Germany
does worse in EMU than in the EMS. In the latter, it can stay on its optimal
stabilisation line, while in the former it has to accept point EG which implies less
stabilisation of the unemployment shock. Exactly the opposite holds in France. EMU
is definitely better from the point of view of stabilising shocks in unemployment. In
EMU, the same unemployment shock is better stabilised (point EF) than in the EMS
(point F). Since in EMU there is no stabilisation at all (given our assumption of pure
asymmetry in shocks), the EMS actually destabilises unemployment in France. That
is, the EMS monetary regime reinforces the unemployment shock in France.
Figure 4: Asymmetric shocks and monetary policy in the EMS
GERMANY FRANCE
  Inflation inflation
          G          F
         EG           EF
UN     U2   U1      U UN U
We can construct a “stabilisation” line of France under the EMS-regime (assuming
that shocks are purely asymmetric) much in the same way as we derived stabilisation
lines in Fig. 3. We show this in Fig. 5. Under EMU there is no stabilisation, so that
8the economy moves along the horizontal line when the Phillips curve shifts up and
down. Under the EMS regime these shocks in the Phillips curve are amplified, so that
the economy moves along the negatively sloped “stabilisation” line. Thus, when
shocks are asymmetric, the EMS destabilises unemployment. This feature is absent in
EMU. We conclude that from the point of view of France EMU is welfare improving
because it leads to a less inefficient stabilisation than the EMS.
Note that the more the shocks become symmetric the closer the stabilisation lines
approach the upward sloping stabilisation line under symmetry. In the limit of pure
symmetry the two regimes (EMU and EMS) have the same stabilisation properties.
Figure 5: Stabilisation under EMU and EMS when shocks are asymmetric.
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4. Asymmetries in the transmission and optimal monetary policies
In the preceding sections we analysed how asymmetric shocks affect the monetary
policies of the ECB. In this section we take a different perspective. We study
symmetric shocks but stress that these can be transmitted in an asymmetric way
because economies can have different structures and institutions. Recently, exciting
new research has been undertaken analysing these differences in institutions within
9Euroland 3. These asymmetric transmission processes arise because institutions in
labour markets, in products markets and in financial markets differ. Quite often these
differences have a deeper cause that relate to culture, social and legal systems.
In this section we focus on just one such institutional asymmetry, i.e. the one that
exists in the labour markets. We will assume that there are two countries that differ in
the degree of rigidity in their labour markets. One country has a high degree of
rigidity, the other has a low degree of rigidity in its labour market. We represent these
two countries in figure 6. The “flexible” country is characterised by a relatively flat
short-term Phillips curve, the “rigid” country by a relatively steep one. Put differently,
due to rigidities in its labour markets, inflationary surprises have little effect on
unemployment in the rigid country.
Figure 6
Flexible country Rigid country
   Inflation        Inflation
      E  E’
U           U
We now assume that the ECB estimates the euro-wide short-term Phillips curve. This
produces an estimated Phillips curve whose slope is an average of the slopes of the
Phillips curves of the individual countries. We represent this euro-Phillips curve by
the downward sloping dotted lines. We also assume that the ECB is target
conservative, i.e. that it does not target the unemployment rate below the natural
unemployment rate. This ensures that the inflation bias disappears. The ECB now
computes the optimal stabilisation path for Euroland as a whole based on its estimate
                                                
3  See Cecchetti(1999) and Maclennan, et al. (1999).
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of the euro-Phillips curve. This yields the upward sloping optimal stabilisation line. In
the absence of shocks equilibrium is obtained in E and E’.
Let us now analyse the effect of a symmetric shock. We assume this takes the form of
an equal displacement of the short-term Phillips curves in the two countries. We
present this shock in figure 7. In both countries the Phillips-curve shifts to the right by
the same distance UN – U1. Since the shock is the same, the euro-Phillips curve shifts
to the right by the same amount. The ECB now computes the optimal response to the
shock and finds the point E, which is located at the intersection of the euro-Phillips
curve and its optimal stabilisation path. Thus the optimal inflation rate for Euroland is
p1 The unemployment rates in the two countries is given by the points F and R. Not
surprisingly, in the flexible country the stabilisation done by the ECB is quite
effective in limiting the increase in unemployment. This is much less the case in the
rigid country. There the stabilisation effort of the ECB does very little to reduce the
impact of the shock in unemployment.
Figure 7
Flexible country Rigid country
S
S
    p1          F    E           E     R
         S     UN U1      S UN         U1
We conclude that, due to structural differences in the workings of the labour markets,
the same policy of the ECB has very different effects on outcomes in different
countries.
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6. The Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB: A description
The ECB has formulated the strategy it will follow to set monetary policies in
Euroland. This strategy is about the definition of the ultimate targets (inflation,
output) and the intermediate targets. As is well known, the ultimate targets are often
affected very indirectly and with long lags. Therefore, central banks select
intermediate targets that are known to influence the ultimate targets, and that can be
influenced more directly by the central banks. We first describe the ECB-strategy. In
the next sections we critically evaluate it.
The first step in the formulation of the Monetary Policy Strategy (MPS) consists in
giving a precise definition of price stability. The Governing Council of the ECB has
adopted the following definition: “price stability shall be defined as a year-on-year
increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of
below 2%” (ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 1999, p. 46). The ECB adds that for all
practical purposes this phrasing implies a target range of inflation of 0 to 2%. Price
stability according to this definition “is to be maintained over the medium run”. This
means, for example, that if inflation suddenly increases above the target range due to
a large disturbance, the ECB will allow for a gradual adjustment back to the target
range. The ECB, however, does not define what the “medium run” is.
Having identified the target of monetary policies the ECB then describes the strategy
to achieve it. A “two-pillar” approach is proposed. The first pillar is the monetary one.
Since inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon, money should be given a
prominent role in this strategy. In order to see this, it is useful to start from the
quantity theory equation, which we can write (in log-linear form) as follows:
m + v = p + y (1)
where m is the log of the money stock, v is the log of the velocity of money, p is the
log of the price level, and y is the log of real GDP.
We can also express this equation in first differences. This yields, after rearranging
Dm = Dp + Dy - Dv (2)
where D is the change from one year to the other. Since we take changes of logarithms
these changes should be interpreted as percentage changes. Equation (2) can be
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interpreted as the growth rate of the money stock that is consistent with a particular
target of inflation, given the underlying growth rates of GDP and of velocity.
The first pillar of the ECB strategy can now be described as follows. The ECB makes
a forecast of the future trend growth of real GDP (Dy). In its Monthly Report of
January 1999 this was estimated to be approximately 2%. Next the ECB forecasts
future velocity of money. In the same Monthly Report velocity was estimated to
decline in a trend-wise fashion by approximately 0.5% per year. Thus Dv = - 0.5%.
With these two numbers fixed, the ECB finds the growth rate of the money stock that
is consistent with the inflation target, which is at most 2%. As a result, the money
stock should not be increasing by more than 4.5% per year4. This is then the target for
the money stock growth. The ECB selected M3 as the relevant money stock
definition.
This is the same procedure as the one followed by the Bundesbank in the past. The
ECB, however, stresses that the 4.5% money stock number should not be considered
as a target, but rather as a “reference value”. This means that if the actual increase in
M3 exceeds 4.5%, the ECB may (or may not) take action to reduce the growth rate of
M3 (by raising short-term interest rates, for example). Thus, the deviation between the
actual money growth and the target value will be interpreted flexibly by the ECB.
Although the wording was different, this was also the attitude of the Bundesbank
towards the use of the money growth target. The main difference between the use of
the money stock as a reference value by the ECB and as a target by the Bundesbank is
the fact that the latter defined a corridor between which the money stock was steered
whereas the ECB uses a point value. In this sense it can be said that the Bundesbank
commitment to its money stock target was higher than the ECB’s commitment to the
reference value. Whether in practice this difference amounts to much is unclear. The
Bundesbank is known to have let the money stock wander outside the corridor 50% of
the time.
The second pillar in the Monetary Policy Strategy remains very vague. The ECB will
use a wide range of indicators of future price developments. “These variables include,
inter alia, wages, the exchange rate, bond prices and the yield curve, various
measures of real activity, fiscal policy indicators, price and cost indices and business
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and consumer surveys” (ECB, Monthly Report, January 1999, p.49). Thus, if for
example wages increase a lot in Euroland, the ECB may deem this to threaten future
price stability and may therefore take appropriate action (in this case increase the
short-term interest rate, and/or reduce liquidity in the system). Again the ECB has
preferred not to tie itself down. The list of potential indicators is open-ended. Others
may be added, and those on the list may or may not receive much attention.
In a nutshell, the Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB sets an inflation target of 2%
at most. In order to steer actual inflation towards that target, the ECB watches a
number of variables that influence future inflation. The most prominent of these
variables (the intermediate targets) is the growth rate of M3. In the next section we
evaluate this monetary policy strategy.
7. The Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB: An evaluation
The Monetary Policy Strategy (MPS) of the ECB can be criticised on several grounds.
We will concentrate here on the selection of the ultimate target, on the privileged use
of the money stock as an intermediate target, and on alternative strategies.
7.1 The selection of the target
In its written documents the ECB recognises only one target of monetary policy. In
the January Monthly Bulletin where the MPS is described in detail there is no
reference to any other objective other than price stability. This goes counter to the
Treaty, which mandates that the ECB should also pursue other targets, if these do not
interfere with price stability. Thus, the ECB has been capable of redefining the
contract it has with the rest of society by substantially narrowing its responsibilities.
In effect it is claiming that it can only be made accountable for maintaining price
stability. The Treaty, however, had defined these responsibilities to be broader
although, as is well-known, considers price stability to be the primary objective. The
ECB seems to have interpreted to mean sole objective. This state of affairs is quite
surprising and will surely lead to problems in the future.
                                                                                                                                           
4  This number could change in the future if the ECB deems that the trend growth of GDP
and/or of velocity changes.
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It is useful to point out here that the exclusive targeting of inflation does not
necessarily mean that other objectives cannot be realised at the same time. In
particular inflation targeting also leads to output stabilisation when the source of the
shock comes from the demand side (see Bofinger(1999) and Clarida, et al. (1999) on
this issue). This is illustrated in Fig. 10.
The left panel shows an economy experiencing a boom, which is the result of a high
level of aggregate demand (represented by the dotted AD-line). As a result, output
exceeds full capacity level (the normal level). To prevent inflationary pressures the
ECB will follow restrictive monetary policies (shown by the arrow, which shifts the
AD-line back to its normal level). This has the effect of stabilising both the price level
and the output level. There is no trade-off between price and output stabilisation when
shocks in aggregate demand occur.
Things are very different when shocks originate in the supply side of the economy.
We show this in the right panel of Fig. 10. The economy has experienced a negative
supply shock, which lowers output but increases prices. When the ECB targets the
price level, it will tend to reduce aggregate demand thereby lowering the price level
again at the expense of an even lower output level. In this case there is a trade-off
between inflation and output stabilisation. (This was also the underlying assumption
when we discussed the optimal stabilisation in the context of the Barro-Gordon
model). In its official pronouncements, the ECB has made it clear that when there is
such a trade-off, it will always pursue price stabilisation.
Fortunately, the ECB has left the door open for some output stabilisation even in this
case of a supply shock. As mentioned earlier, the ECB defines price stability over the
“medium run”. Thus, if after a supply shock, prices start to rise, the ECB may apply
gradualism in its response. This means that it would not immediately react by
restrictive monetary policies aiming at stopping the price increases immediately.
Instead it would try to gradually lower the inflationary pressures. In doing so, it would
avoid the sharp decline in output.
It should be mentioned that proponents of inflation targeting (e.g. Svensson(1997))
have stressed that the gradual transition to the inflation target after a shock is the right
approach and allows a central bank to also care about output stabilisation. The future
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actions of the ECB will make clear whether the ECB is willing to follow this
gradualist approach to inflation targeting.
The decision to lower the interest rate in April 1999 suggests that the ECB is taking
into account other objectives than price stability. In particular the decline in the
growth rates of output observed at that time may have influenced the ECB to relax its
monetary policy stance. Thus, there may be a difference between the official ECB-
pronouncements and it policy actions, whereby the former are tougher than the latter.
This may be part of a strategy to achieve credibility. In the long run it will be
important, however, to make words and actions consistent in order to maintain
credibility.
Figure 10
Demand shock Supply shock
Normal output Normal output
7.2 Is the inflation target of at most 2% too low?
In the 1950s Milton Friedman formulated the view that the optimal inflation rate is
zero. The basic reason for this conclusion is that a zero inflation rate maximises the
total utility of holding money. Two other factors, that recently have been much
researched, cast doubts on this conclusion.
16
First, there is evidence that because of rapid technological change the conventional
measures of inflation (the rate of change of the consumption price index) tend to
overestimate the true inflation rate by 1 to 2 % a year (see Gordon (1996), and
Shapiro and Wilcox(1996)). The reason is that the conventional measures of inflation
do not take into account quality improvements5. As an example, take a personal
computer in 1999 and compare it to one in 1980. Their price may be approximately
the same. However, the computing power of the 1999 version is probably 1000 times
greater, if not more. As a result, the price per unit of computing power in 1999
dropped to a very small fraction of what it was in 1980. Many similar examples can
be given. We conclude that if we observe an inflation rate of 1 to 2%, the true
underlying inflation rate is probably zero.
Second, there are theoretical arguments to be made for a rate of inflation a little higher
than 0%. The main one is that sectoral or micro-economic shocks require adjustments
in relative real wages. In particular, sometimes a sector or a firm is confronted by a
negative shock necessitating a decline in the real wage level. If the rate of inflation is
zero, such a decline in the real wage can only come about by a decline in the nominal
wage rate. If, however, inflation is positive one can achieve a decline in the real wage
by keeping the nominal wage increases below the rate of inflation. There is a lot of
evidence that the resistance against nominal wage reductions is high, thereby limiting
real wage adjustments when the rate of inflation is zero. Put differently, in a
environment of zero inflation, there is likely to be more real wage rigidity making
adjustments to asymmetric sectoral shocks more difficult to achieve. In a recent
article Ackerlof, et al., (1996) come to the conclusion that this effect may require the
monetary authorities to target an inflation rate close to 2% per year.
The previous analysis then leads to the conclusion that the optimal inflation rate may
be of the order of 3 to 4% per year (1 to 2% on account of the measurement bias, and
2% on account of the real wage effect).
The ECB has recognised the quality bias problem, although it claims that it is less
important in Euroland than in the US. Thus, implicitly the ECB considers the lower
bound of the inflation target range to be a larger than zero. It has not been willing to
                                                
5 There are other reasons too. For example, when the price of a particular commodity
increases, consumers will substitute that commodity with a cheaper one. Measurements of
inflation typically disregard these substitution effects.
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put an exact number for this lower bound, except that it may be of the order of 0.5%.
If this is confirmed this would argue for a redefinition of the target range to fall
between 0.5% and 2.5%. Surprisingly, the ECB seems to be willing to accept that the
quality bias increases the lower bound of the target range, but not the upper bound.
The ECB has made it clear that it does not buy the real wage flexibility argument.
All this leads to the conclusion that the ECB may have set its inflation target too low
for the good of Euroland’s economy.
There are many other aspects about inflation that may lead to qualify this conclusion.
One is that inflation tends to distort savings decisions. In particular, taxes are usually
based on nominal quantities. As a result a tax on interest rates will have a larger real
impact when inflation is high than when it is low. This will tend to lower savings. The
existence of inflation, however, tends to reduce the tax burden of firms. The reason is
that firms can subtract the interest costs of their debt. This will be larger when
inflation is high. All this complicates the question of how high the optimal inflation
rate is.
7.3 Excessive reliance on the money stock?
The ECB has singled out the money stock (M3) as a privileged indicator for steering
its monetary policy actions. This approach has come under increasing criticism. Most
central banks that used it at some point (the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England
in the 1980s) have dropped it. The Bundesbank was the only major central bank that
used it until 1999 (when it lost its sovereignty). However, there is strong evidence that
it was not very successful in its money stock targeting. Half of the time the actual
money stock numbers fell outside the targeted range 6
The reasons why central banks were not successful in using the money stock as an
intermediate target are the following. First, the concept of money stock is very
elusive. Should one use M1, M2, or a broader concept of money stock? The ECB has
selected a broad concept of M3. Financial innovations can, however, affect these
numbers in ways that have nothing to do with signals of future inflation.
                                                
6  See Bernanke, B., and Mihov, (1997), and Clarida and Gertler (1996). This has led these
authors to conclude that the strong reputation of the Bundesbank had nothing to do with
18
Second, and more importantly, as equation (2) makes clear, the precision with which
targeting the money stock will bring us close to the ultimate inflation target depends
on the precision with which output growth and velocity growth can be forecast. Major
problems have arisen with forecasting velocity growth. This is due to the fast speed of
financial innovation, which has led to unpredictable behaviour of velocity7.
The result of all this is that most central banks that attempted to apply money supply
targeting, have been quite unsuccessful, and have missed their announced targets most
often, and by wide margins. It also means that the money stock numbers give too
many wrong signals about the future course of inflation to be useful as an
intermediate target. Whether one calls the money stock the “reference value” (as the
ECB does) or an intermediate target does not change the essence of this criticism. M3
will be pretty much useless as a reference value much of the time.
The ECB seems to have understood this criticism. In the first half of 1999 the growth
rate of M3 has consistently been above its reference value of 4.5% and yet the ECB
did not act on this signal. It must be that it judged that M3 was giving wrong signals.
One can understand that the ECB, concerned as it was of building up its reputation,
decided to copy the Bundesbank behaviour as closely as possible. This included
copying the Bundesbank in its (unsuccessful) attempt at monetary targeting. It is
likely that, once the ECB has grown up, it will decide to drop this relic of the past.
This means that it will use the money stock as one of the many indicators of future
inflation without giving it the privileged position it has now.
                                                                                                                                           
money targeting (which the Bundesbank failed to apply successfully). It had everything to do
with its success at keeping inflation low.
7  There is a large literature on the question of whether the European money demand equation
is more predictable than the national money demand equations (see Monticelli(1996)). The
evidence indicates that in the past the European money demand was more stable than the
national money demand functions. It has been stressed by Arnold and de Vries(1997) that this
is due to the fact that the uncorrelated error terms of the national money demand functions
tend to offset each other in the aggregation process towards a European money demand
function.
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7.4 Inflation targeting: A model for the ECB?
Recently, several central banks in the industrialised world (Bank of Canada, Bank of
England, Bank of Sweden) have shifted towards inflation targeting. The academic
enthusiasm for this strategy has been quite strong8.
With inflation targeting is meant here a strategy whereby the central bank not only
chooses inflation as its ultimate target (which the ECB is doing), but also uses its
inflation forecasts as the intermediate target. It will then typically also announce this
inflation forecast. Practically this means that if the ECB would apply this strategy it
would collect information on all the variables (including the money stock) it thinks
matter to influence future inflation. This would lead the ECB to arrive at a forecast of
the future inflation rate. If this (unconditional) forecast exceeds the target level of
inflation (2%), this would be a signal for the ECB to tighten monetary policy, and
vice versa. Thus, inflation targeting is similar to money stock targeting. Both
strategies have as their ultimate target the rate of inflation. Their choice of the
intermediate target, however is different.  In the money stock targeting the money
stock is used as an intermediate target, in the inflation targeting it is the current
forecast of inflation that plays the role of intermediate target. We represent this in
Table 1. (We assume that in both cases the central bank uses the interest rate as its
operational instrument).
It has been claimed by the proponents of inflation targeting that this is superior to
money stock targeting (see Svensson(1998)). The reason is that in the inflation
targeting strategy the central bank uses information of all the variables (including the
money stock) that will affect future inflation. The forecasted inflation is then the best
possible intermediate target. This contrasts with money stock targeting that omits a lot
of information and, in addition, uses irrelevant information also (because as we
argued earlier, the money stock today can change for reasons that have nothing to do
with inflation). In this sense inflation targeting is superior to money stock targeting
because it uses all relevant information to steer the inflation rate to its target level.
If the current experiments with inflation targeting in a number of central banks turn
out to be successful, it is likely that an increasing number of central banks will want
to use it, including the ECB.
                                                
8  For an evaluation, see Bernanke, et al. (1999).
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Table 1:
Instrument Intermediate target Ultimate target
MS-targeting   interest rate    money stock      inflation
Inflation targeting   interest rate    inflation forecast      inflation
Conclusion
In this article we have analysed issues relating to monetary policies in Euroland.
There is no doubt that up to this day the policy record of the ECB has been reasonably
successful. Nevertheless, challenges for the future abound. In this article we have
stressed these challenges. A first one has to do with the difficulties of setting
monetary policies in an environment in which asymmetric shocks occur and in which
the transmission mechanisms differ between countries. We have argued that these
asymmetries could paralyse the ECB in the future. In addition, we have also
concluded from this analysis that the ECB should attach a greater importance to
information about national economic conditions.
A second challenge arises concerning the formulation of the Monetary Policy
Strategy. This strategy was announced as the official one that would guide future
policy actions. As it stands today, this strategy contains too many flaws. It is too
vague, and thereby can generate a lot of uncertainty about the ECB’s policy
intentions. It also attaches too much importance to the targeting of the money stock.
There is a general consensus today among economists that the money stock is too
noisy an indicator to warrant the special treatment the ECB is giving. Most probably
the ECB agrees with this view since it has not been willing to use the signal this
indicator was giving during 1999. It is advisable that the ECB stops pretending it is
giving a special importance to the money stock. The Monetary Policy Strategy does
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not describe well what the ECB is doing in practice. In order to maintain its credibility
it is advisable that the ECB preaches what it does.
Finally we have also argued that the ECB sets its inflation target to low for the good
of Euroland’s economy. In the defence of the ECB it must be said that its intention is
to move to the inflation target in a gradual way, thereby allowing to take into account
other objectives of monetary policies. The future will tell what exactly this gradualism
à la ECB implies.
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APPENDIX: The optimal stabilisation path in the Barro-Gordon model
In this appendix we derive the optimal stabilisation path used in our analysis of the
Barro-Gordon model in this chapter. We start out by specifying the loss function of
the central bank as follows:
L =  (p  - p*)2 + b(u – u*)2 (1)
where L is the loss of the central bank. This is a function of the difference between
observed (p) and target inflation (p*), and of the difference between observed (u) and
target (u*) unemployment; b is the weight attached by the central bank to stabilising
the unemployment around the target. We will assume that target inflation is zero
(p*=0). Target unemployment is assumed to be determined by the following
expression
u* = l uN
where uN is the natural unemployment rate. We assume that l < 1, i.e. the central
bank targets an unemployment rate below the natural rate. The usual rationale for this
assumption is that distortions in the labour market keep the natural unemployment
rate too high. The first best solution would be to remove these distortions. If this first
best policy cannot be achieved, the second best policy consists in targeting the
unemployment rate below its natural level.
The short term Phillips curve is specified as follows:
u = uN - a(p  - pe)  + e (2)
where pe is expected inflation, and e is a stochastic disturbance in output. This Phillips
curve equation captures the standard assumption that only inflation surprises can
affect unemployment. More precisely, an unexpected increase in inflation lowers
unemployment relative to its natural level. The parameter a is the elasticity of
unemployment with respect to inflation surprises.
The central bank now minimises its loss function with respect to inflation, given the
inflation expectations of agents. We use the conventional assumption that the central
bank directly controls inflation. We could alternatively add an equation linking
inflation to some policy instrument such as the money stock (see Walsh(1998)).
Substituting (2) into (1) yields:
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L =  p2 + b[a(pe - p) + (1 - l) uN+ e]2 (3)
Taking the derivative of L with respect to p , and solving for p  yields the optimal
inflation rate for a given expected inflation:
           a2b      ab(1 - l)           ab
p  = ---------- pe + ------------ uN +  ---------- e (4)
        1 + a2b       1 + a2b        1 + a2b
In a rational expectations world agents know this optimal rule that the authorities use.
They will therefore incorporate this rule in their expectations formation. Thus they set
their expectations accordingly, i.e.
           a2b       ab(1 - l)
pe = ---------- pe + ------------ uN (5)
        1 + a2b        1 + a2b
Note that the expected value of e is zero. This is why the last term in (4) drops out
when we take expectations. We can now solve for pe. This yields
pe = ab(1 - l) uN (6)
We obtain the well-known result of the Barro-Gordon model: in equilibrium the
average inflation is positive reflecting an inflation bias. This inflation bias increases
with a, b and uN.
Given that there are shocks in the Phillips curve the observed inflation will deviate
from this average inflation, reflecting the fact that the central bank sets the inflation
rate so as to reduce the variance of unemployment. Thus
      ab
p  = pe + -----------  e (7)
               1 + a2b
or
          ab
p  = ab(1 - l) uN + -----------  e (8)
                     1 + a2b
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We can now substitute (8) into the Phillips curve. This yields the solution for u:
     1
u = uN + ---------- e (9)
         1 + a2b
Equation (9) says that on average u = uN, i.e. the authorities cannot systematically
have an unemployment rate below the natural level. The unemployment rate will
deviate from this average when there are shocks in the Phillips curve. Consider a
positive shock, e > 0. In this case the effect of the shock on unemployment will be
influenced by b, i.e. the stabilisation parameter in the loss function of the authorities.
The larger is this b, the weaker is the effect of a given shock on unemployment. Note
that a high b also produces a high inflation bias. The latter is the price the authorities
pay for their stabilisation efforts.
We can now derive the optimal stabilisation path as follows. Take the derivative of p
with respect to e, and the derivative of u with respect to e. This yields
d p          ab
----  = --------- (10)
 d e     1 + a2b
d u      1
----  =  ---------- (11)
d e        1 + a2b
Equation (10) tells us how the central bank optimally sets the inflation rate in
response to shocks. Equation (11) says how this optimal response to shocks affects the
unemployment rate. Taking the ratio of these two expressions yields the slope of the
optimal stabilisation line, i.e
dp/du = ab
Thus, the optimal stabilisation line becomes steeper when the parameters a and b
increase.
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